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INSUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS AND
FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A FOOTNOTE
TO THE TERM-LIMITS DEBATE
Jonathan L. Entin*
In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,' the Supreme Court held that the
Qualifications Clauses2 prevent the states from restricting the length of service
of members of Congress. 3 Some states have sought unsuccessfully to evade this
result by seeking to compel candidates for the House of Representatives and the
Senate to support a constitutional amendment permitting congressional term
limits.
4
Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relied on Term
Limits to invalidate a California law requiring congressional candidates to be
registered voters in the state when they file nomination papers, a requirement
that prevented a Nevada resident who asserted an intention to relocate to the
Golden State from running in a special election to fill a vacancy in the House of
Representatives.5 The California law required congressional candidates to
* Professor of Law and Political Science, Case Western Reserve University.
514 U.S. 779 (1995).
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 ("No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have
attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United
States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be
chosen."); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 ("No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to
the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall
not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.").
3 The Court reached this conclusion despite the state's characterization of the restriction at
issue as a limitation on ballot access rather than on eligibility for continued membership in
the federal legislature. This was, according to the majority, a distinction without a difference.
See Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 829-31.
4 Under these proposals, the ballot would contain a statement noting which candidates had
refused to support such an amendment. The prospect of a pejorative ballot description label-
ing them as disdainful of the voters' hostility toward career politicians presumably would
supply an incentive for candidates to promote term limits. The Supreme Court recently inval-
idated one of these measures. See Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001). Every other court
that considered the issue before the Supreme Court's ruling also found this approach to be
unconstitutional under the Qualifications Clauses or other provisions. See Gralike v. Cook,
191 F.3d 911 (8th Cir. 1999), aff'd, 531 U.S. 510 (2001); Miller v. Moore, 169 F.3d 1119
(8th Cir. 1999); Barker v. Hazeltine, 3 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (D.S.D. 1998); League of Women
Voters of Me. v. Gwadosky, 966 F. Supp. 52 (D. Me. 1997); Donovan v. Priest, 931 S.W.2d
1119 (Ark. 1996); Bramberg v. Jones, 978 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1999); Morrissey v. State, 951
P.2d 911 (Colo. 1998); Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen. re Term Limits Pledge, 718 So.
2d 798 (Fla. 1998); Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term Limits, 15 P.3d 1129 (Idaho
2000); Simpson v. Cenarrusa, 944 P.2d 1372 (Idaho 1997); In re Initiative Petition No. 364,
930 P.2d 186 (Okla. 1996).
5 See Schaefer v. Townsend, 215 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2000), cert denied sub nom. Jones v.
Schaefer, 532 U.S. 904 (2001).
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establish residency before the election, whereas the applicable Qualifications
Clause mandates only that Representatives be state inhabitants at the time of
the election.6
The term-limits debate has not been confined to federal offices. Many
jurisdictions have adopted restrictions on the tenure of state and local legisla-
tors, executives, and judges. While the case law involving state curbs on tenure
in federal offices is consistently hostile, the picture with respect to voter-
imposed term limits for state and local offices is decidedly mixed. Term limits
for state and local officials have survived challenges based on federal law,7
although some of those efforts have foundered on the shoals of state law. 8
6 See id. at 1034. On the possible constitutional significance of the difference between
"inhabitant" and "resident," see Sanford Levinson, 2 Texans, Not 1, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4,
2000, at A27 (noting Republican vice-presidential nominee Richard Cheney's attempt to
establish himself as an inhabitant of Wyoming after many years' residence in Texas, the
home of Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush, to avoid conflict with the
Twelfth Amendment). Cf Jones v. Bush, 122 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex.) (dismissing, for
lack of standing, an action by three Texas voters who invoked the Twelfth Amendment in an
effort to enjoin Texas electors from casting their votes for both Bush and Cheney on the
ground that both men were inhabitants of Texas, and concluding on the merits that Cheney
was not an inhabitant of Texas), affd mem., 244 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 1062 (2001).
7 See, e.g., Citizens for Legislative Choice v. Miller, 144 F.3d 916 (6th Cir. 1998) (state
legislators); League of Women Voters v. Diamond, 965 F. Supp. 96 (D. Me. 1997) (state
legislators and executive officers); Dutmer v. City of San Antonio, 937 F. Supp. 587 (W.D.
Tex. 1996) (members of city council); Miyazawa v. City of Cincinnati, 825 F. Supp. 816
(S.D. Ohio 1993) (members of city council), aff'd, 45 F.3d 126 (6th Cir. 1995).
Perhaps the only exception to this statement is Jones v. Bates, 127 F.3d 839 (9th Cir.
1997), in which a divided panel found term limits for California legislators invalid under the
United States Constitution. The panel ruling was reversed when the case was reheard en
banc. See Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 523 U.S.
1021 (1998).
8 See, e.g., Alaskans for Legislative Reform v. State, 887 P.2d 960 (Alaska 1994) (per
curiam) (holding that term limits could be enacted only through constitutional amendment,
not by statute or initiative); Allred v. McLoud, 31 S.W.3d 836 (Ark. 2000) (invalidating
locally adopted term limits for county officials); Polis v. City of La Palma, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d
322 (Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that state law preempted municipal term-limit ordinance);
Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 641 N.E.2d 525 (Ill. 1994) (per curiam)
(finding improper a proposed constitutional amendment limiting terms of state legislators);
Minneapolis Term Limits Coalition v. Keefe, 535 N.W.2d 306 (Minn. 1995) (concluding
that term limits for city officials would violate state constitution); Cottrell v. Santillanes, 901
P.2d 785 (N.M. Ct. App.) (finding term limits for members of city council inconsistent with
state law), cert. denied, 900 P.2d 962 (N.M. 1995); Lehman v. Bradbury, 37 P.3d 989 (Or.
2002) (striking down term limits for State legislators and state executive officers for failure
to comply with the separate-vote requirement for the adoption of amendments to the state
constitution); Gerberding v. Munro, 949 P.2d 1366 (Wash. 1998) (rejecting proposed initia-
tive that would have imposed term limits on state constitutional officers).
At the same time, many term limits for state and local officials have survived chal-
lenges based on state constitutions and statutes. See, e.g., Ray v. Mortham, 742 So. 2d 1276
(Fla. 1999) (upholding term limits for state legislators and cabinet officers while severing
invalid term limits for members of Congress); City of Jacksonville v. Cook, 765 So. 2d 289
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam) (upholding term limit for clerk of municipal court),
review granted, 786 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2001); Pinellas County v. Eight Is Enough in Pinellas,
775 So. 2d 317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (upholding term limits for county officers), review
granted, 786 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 2001); Abramowitz v. Glasser, 656 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. Dist.
Summer/Fall 2002]
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
In two of the cases involving term limits for state legislators, there have
been suggestions that the federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction. A
Ninth Circuit concurring opinion in Bates v. Jones9 was based on this premise.
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit panel in Citizens for Legislative Choice v. Miller'°
took note of this argument but ultimately put it aside because the state failed to
raise a jurisdictional defense at any stage of the litigation." Both suggestions
were based on the Supreme Court's summary dismissal, "for want of a substan-
tial federal question," of the appeal in Moore v. McCartney,12 a case involving
a state constitutional provision limiting the governor of West Virginia to two
consecutive terms.
The suggestions concerning the absence of jurisdiction were not disposi-
tive in either case, but they are nevertheless significant because both cases were
decided by federal courts of appeals. They are also noteworthy because they
misperceive the concept of a "substantial federal question." These judicial
statements reflect confusion between the precedential weight of the Supreme
Court's summary disposition of an appeal and the power of lower federal courts
to hear cases involving the same or similar issues. Although the Court's docket
now consists almost exclusively of certiorari cases rather than appeals, there are
enough summary dispositions of appeals to cause mischief if district and circuit
judges share the confusion shown in these two term-limits cases. At a time of
increased judicial sensitivity to federalism, 3 that confusion might lead to mis-
taken refusals to hear cases on jurisdictional grounds.
Ct. App.) (upholding term limits for elected city officials), review denied, 664 So. 2d 248
(Fla. 1995); Maddox v. Fortson, 172 S.E.2d 595 (Ga. 1970) (upholding term limit for gover-
nor); Rudeen v. Cenarrusa, 38 P.3d 598 (Idaho 2001) (upholding term limits for statewide
officers, state legislators, and county elected officials); Nev. Judges Ass'n v. Lau, 910 P.2d
898 (Nev. 1996) (upholding term limits for judges but noting that ballot summary must be
clarified so that voters would understand the full ramifications of approving judicial term
limits). Cf Woo v. Superior Ct., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156 (Ct. App. 2000) (narrowly construing
term limits in a newly adopted city charter to comport with the outcome of an earlier referen-
dum on municipal term limits); Kuryak v. Adamczyk, 705 N.Y.S.2d 739 (App. Div. 1999)
(holding municipal term limits to be prospective only).
9 131 F.3d 843, 847-48 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (O'Scannlain, J., concurring in the result),
cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1021 (1998).
10 144 F.3d 916 (6th Cir. 1998).
1" See id. at 919-20.
12 425 U.S. 946 (1976).
'3 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (concluding that Congress had not
validly abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating the civil
rights remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act for exceeding federal power
under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents,
528 U.S. 62 (2000) (finding that Congress had not validly abrogated the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity in extending the protections of the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act to employees of state and local governments); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898 (1997) (holding that Congress may not commandeer state executive officials to imple-
ment a federal regulatory program); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)
(holding that Congress may not abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in fur-
therance of its Article I powers); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating
the Gun Free School Zones Act for exceeding federal power under the Commerce Clause);
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Congress may not comman-
deer state legislatures into enacting federally dictated laws).
[Vol. 2:608
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This article seeks to clear up the confusion over "substantial federal ques-
tions." Part I provides an overview of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, distin-
guishing between appeal and certiorari. Part II examines the precedential
weight of the Court's summary dispositions, contrasting summary disposition
of appeals with denials of certiorari. Part III explains why the suggestions that
the lower courts lack jurisdiction over cases presenting issues in which the
Supreme Court has dismissed appeals "for want of a substantial federal ques-
tion" are mistaken.
I. APPEAL, CERTIORARI, AND THE SUPREME COURT
Today, virtually all of the Supreme Court's appellate docket is discretion-
ary. 14 That is, the Court decides for itself whether to hear a case that was
decided by a lower federal court or the highest state court in which review was
available. A party seeking Supreme Court review generally has no right to
appeal but must instead obtain a writ of certiorari.15
Despite the dominance of certiorari, this procedure is of comparatively
recent vintage. The Court's certiorari jurisdiction was not created until 1891, in
the statute that also established the federal courts of appeals.16 The availability
of certiorari was expanded incrementally in several stages that culminated in
the passage of the Judges' Bill in 1925."7
The other, now rare, means of securing Supreme Court review is by direct
appeal, which is a matter of right in certain types of cases. The appeal mecha-
nism existed virtually from the Court's beginning. The Judiciary Act of 1789
provided for review by writ of error in several classes of cases.18 Specifically,
section 13 gave the Court appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the old circuit
courts and state courts. 9 Section 22 authorized the Court to review decisions of
the circuit courts in civil cases and equitable suits involving amounts in excess
of $2,000. Section 25 empowered the Court to review rulings by state courts
involving certain federal questions, particularly those in which a federal statute
or treaty was ruled invalid or in which a state law or policy was upheld against
a challenge based on the Constitution or other federal law.2° A 1914 statute
expanded the Court's power to review state rulings that upheld a federal law or
14 I use "appellate" here in contrast with "original" jurisdiction. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2
(dividing the Supreme Court's jurisdiction into these two categories).
15 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257-59 (1994).
16 See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826, 828. See generally Peter Linzer, The
Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1227, 1233-36 (1979).
17 See Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936; see also Webb Act, ch. 448, 39 Stat. 726
(1916); Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790. These provisions were codified in Title 28
by the Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869. See generally Linzer, supra
note 16, at 1237-44.
18 See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 1, 13, 22, 25, 1 Stat. 73.
19 One sentence of § 13 was later found to have impermissibly expanded the Court's origi-
nal jurisdiction. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
20 The validity of § 25 was upheld in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304
(1816). See also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (holding that § 25 gave
the Court jurisdiction to review state criminal cases). The Supreme Court did not get juris-
diction over federal criminal cases until 1889, and then only in proceedings involving capital
crimes. See Act of Feb. 6, 1889, ch. 113, 25 Stat. 655. The new courts of appeals were given
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invalidated a state law that was challenged on constitutional or other federal
grounds.2" In 1928 Congress eliminated the writ of error, denominating the
nondiscretionary cases coming before the Court as appeals. Almost all
appeals were eliminated in 1988; since then cases that previously arose as
appeals have become part of the Court's discretionary docket and are handled
through writs of certiorari.2 3
Why does the distinction between appeal and certiorari matter? If the
Court accords plenary consideration to a case and issues a formal opinion, it
makes no real difference whether the case reached the docket as a matter of
right or through the exercise of judicial discretion. A ruling on the merits binds
the parties to the case and serves as a precedent for future disputes.
The question arises because the Court cannot and does not accord plenary
consideration to every case. Indeed, the whole point of certiorari was to allow
the justices to refuse to hear cases that do not warrant further review. Even
before the adoption of the certiorari process on a wide scale, the Court also
developed mechanisms to give less than full treatment to appeals. This sum-
mary treatment of appeals arose from the same concerns that led to the creation
of the circuit courts of appeals and the use of certiorari: the Court's docket was
being overwhelmed by an excessive number of cases. 24 As a result, the justices
necessarily exercised a measure of discretion in deciding which appeals war-
ranted plenary consideration, and they did so in ways that blurred the distinc-
tion between appeal and certiorari.25
A denial of certiorari, the Court has often explained, has no precedential
weight. This "orthodox view" of certiorari denials 26 is reflected most famously
jurisdiction over criminal cases in 1891. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826,
828.
21 See Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790. Such cases were placed within the Court's
certiorari, or discretionary, jurisdiction rather than within its appeal, or mandatory, authority.
This particular change was made in response to a state-court decision invalidating New
York's pioneering worker's compensation law. See Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry., 94 N.E. 431
(N.Y. 1911). Supreme Court review was impossible because § 25 limited the Court's juris-
diction over state decisions to cases in which the federal claim was rejected, whereas in this
case the federal claim was upheld and resulted in the abrogation of the state law. See WIL-
LIAM G. Ross, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT
THE COURTS, 1890-1937, at 82-84 (1994); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 4012, at 217-18 (2d ed.
1996). Earlier, Congress had amended § 25 in less substantial ways. See Act of Feb. 5, 1867,
ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
22 See Act of Jan. 31, 1928, ch. 14, 45 Stat. 54. See generally WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
21, §§ 4002, 4006.
23 See Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662.
24 For example, the Court's docket nearly quadrupled between 1860 and 1880, and the 1890
term began with a backlog of more than 1,800 cases. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M.
LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 60, 86 (1928); Francis J. Ulman & Frank H.
Spears, "Dismissed for Want of a Substantial Federal Question ": A Study in the Practice of
the Supreme Court in Deciding Appeals from State Courts, 20 B.U. L. REv. 501, 508 (1940).
25 See Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October
Term, 1929, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1, 12, 14 (1930).
26 See Linzer, supra note 16, at 1251, 1255, 1260, 1302.
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in Justice Frankfurter's opinion "respecting the denial of the petition for writ of
certiorari" in Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show:
27
Inasmuch ... as all that a denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari means is that
fewer than four members of the Court thought it should be granted, this Court has
rigorously insisted that such a denial carries with it no implication whatever regard-
ing the Court's views on the merits of a case which it has declined to review.
2 8
If denials of certiorari are not precedents and the Court has treated appeals
analogously to certiorari cases, we might then wonder whether dispositions of
appeals with less than plenary consideration also have no precedential signifi-
cance. That is the subject of the next section.
II. THE PRECEDENTIAL VALUE OF SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS OF APPEALS
The Supreme Court could summarily dispose of appeals in several ways.
The two most common methods were summary affirmance and dismissal "for
want of a substantial federal question." Traditionally, the Court reserved sum-
mary affirmances for appeals coming from federal courts when the ruling in
question was correct and the case presented no legally troublesome issue; if a
case came from a state court in similar circumstances, the appeal was "dis-
missed for want of a substantial federal question." 29
Whether appeals came from federal or state courts, the overwhelming
majority received summary treatment.30 The precedential weight (if any) to be
accorded to summary dispositions generated widespread uncertainty. Justice
Clark, sitting by designation on the Fourth Circuit after his retirement, thought
that such rulings should have minimal weight. He opined that, during his tenure
on the Supreme Court, summary dispositions of appeals were "treat[ed] simi-
27 338 U.S. 912 (1950).
28 Id. at 919. For other statements of the orthodox view, see, e.g., Singleton v. Comm'r, 439
U.S. 940, 942-45 (1978) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of the petition for writ of certio-
rari); Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 364 n.1 (1973); Parker v.
Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 576 (1960) (per curiam), overruled on other grounds by Carafas v.
LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968); United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 228 n.10 (1955);
Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 180 (1947); House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 48 (1945) (per
curiam), overruled on other grounds by Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236 (1998). But see
United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 443 (1973) (finding "not without some significance"
dissents from a denial of certiorari); Linzer, supra note 16, at 1277-91 (discussing Kras and
other cases in which certiorari denials have been accorded precedential value).
29 See ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 266 (7th ed. 1993). We will
also briefly consider a third approach, dismissal "for want of jurisdiction." See id. at 267-68.
See also infra Part III. A fourth technique for summarily disposing of appeals was the "ade-
quate state ground," under which appeals from state courts were dismissed without plenary
consideration where the decision rested on nonfederal grounds that were sufficient to resolve
the case. See STERN ET AL., supra at 267-68. See generally WRICHT ET AL., supra note 21,
§§ 4019-33. The adequate-state-ground doctrine is beyond the scope of this article.
30 See STERN ET AL., supra note 29, at 210, 211; Ulman & Spears, supra note 24, at 523-24,
n.112; Pamela R. Winnick, Comment, The Precedential Weight of a Dismissal by the
Supreme Court for Want of a Substantial Federal Question: Some Implications of Hicks v.
Miranda, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 508, 517-18 n.52 (1976); Note, The Discretionary Power of the
Supreme Court to Dismiss Appeals from State Courts, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 688, 694 n.54
(1963). See also Note, Supreme Court Per Curiam Practice: A Critique, 69 HARV. L. REV.
707, 708, n.9 (1956).
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lar[ly]" to certiorari denials. 3 Leading scholars disagreed about the question.
Some argued that summary dispositions were entitled to precedential weight
because the Court had a constitutional obligation to reach the merits of every
case within its appellate jurisdiction.3 2 Others maintained that summary dispo-
sitions reflected prudential concerns as much as substantive ones and therefore
should not count as precedents.3 3
The Supreme Court resolved the debate in favor of treating summary dis-
positions as precedents in Hicks v. Miranda,34 a 1975 decision involving the
validity of the California obscenity statute. The owner of an adult theater who
was prosecuted for showing the movie "Deep Throat" filed a First Amendment
challenge to the statute.35 A three-judge federal district court invalidated the
statute under the standard established in Miller v. California.3 6 Before that rul-
ing became final, however, the Supreme Court dismissed, for want of a sub-
stantial federal question, an appeal from a state-court ruling upholding the same
statute under the Miller test.37 On direct appeal from the district court in Hicks,
the Supreme Court held that the summary dismissal constituted a binding pre-
cedent. Justice White's majority opinion explained that "[tihe three-judge court
was not free to disregard this pronouncement."3 Because that appeal presented
a federal question, the Court "had no discretion to refuse adjudication of the
case on its merits as would have been true had the case been brought here under
our certiorari jurisdiction"; the justices "were required to deal with its merits,"
and lower courts were obliged to follow this summary disposition.
39
Concluding that summary dispositions in appeals have precedential value
does not resolve the question of how much weight these rulings have. The
Court provided its answer the year before Hicks, concluding in Edelman v.
Jordan4" that appeals decided summarily have less "precedential value" than
do cases resolved after plenary consideration and a full opinion.4 Edelman
involved a class action alleging that Illinois welfare officials had improperly
administered public assistance programs and wrongfully withheld benefits from
eligible recipients.4 2 The officials asserted an Eleventh Amendment defense,
31 Hogge v. Johnson, 526 F.2d 833, 836 (4th Cir. 1975) (Clark, J., concurring), cert. denied,
428 U.S. 913 (1976).
32 See Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues" - A Comment on Princi-
ple and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10-13 (1964); Herbert Wechs-
ler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1959).
33 See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term - Foreword: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 46 (1961). For additional sources on both sides of the schol-
arly debate, see United States ex rel. Epton v. Nenna, 318 F. Supp. 899, 906 n.8 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 948 (1971).
34 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
11 During the pendency of these proceedings he was also charged with violating the same
obscenity statute for showing "The Devil in Miss Jones." See id. at 341 n.10.
36 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
31 See Miller v. California, 418 U.S. 915 (1974).
38 Hicks, 422 U.S. at 344.
39 Id.
40 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
41 See id. at 671. This conclusion was anticipated and more fully elaborated in David W.
Brown, Note, Summary Disposition of Supreme Court Appeals: The Significance of Limited
Discretion and a Theory of Limited Precedent, 52 B.U. L. REV. 373, 407-10 (1972).
42 See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 653-55.
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arguing that any payment of back benefits would come from the state treasury
even though the state was not named as a defendant.4 3 The Court accepted this
argument despite the existence of three district-court rulings awarding similar
relief that had been summarily affirmed on appeal over Eleventh Amendment
objections. 44 Because those cases did not explicitly address the Eleventh
Amendment, they could not of their own force control the disposition of
Edelman.4
The Court took a similar approach in Caban v. Mohammed,46 which inval-
idated a New York law that allowed the mother of a child born to unmarried
parents to give unilateral consent to the child's adoption. The state relied in part
on Orsini v. Blasi,4 7 which had dismissed an appeal, for want of a substantial
federal question, from a state-court ruling upholding the same statute. The
Court explained that Orsini "was a ruling on the merits, and therefore [was]
entitled to precedential weight,"4 8 but was "not entitled to the same deference
given a ruling after briefing, argument, and a written opinion."'49 Full consider-
ation of the issue on the merits led to the conclusion that Orsini should be
overruled.5°
There are other cases in which appeals decided summarily have not been
followed,5" but they are the exception rather than the rule. This is quite predict-
able. Summary dispositions typically reflect the Court's views on the merits,
and "the Justices are not likely to change their minds after they have once come
to such a conclusion."52 But establishing that summary decisions have at least
limited precedential value does not resolve the matter. Whatever weight sum-
43 See id. at 668.
44 See id. at 670, n.13 (citing Sterrett v. Mothers' & Childrens' Rights Org., 409 U.S. 809
(1972); State Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Zarate, 407 U.S. 918 (1972);
Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49 (1970)). The Court also noted that the Eleventh Amendment
was raised, but not discussed in the opinion, in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969),
which upheld an order for retroactive welfare payments to recipients who had been denied
assistance under an unconstitutional residency requirement. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 670-
71.
45 See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 671.
46 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
47 423 U.S. 1042 (1976).
48 Caban, 441 U.S. at 389 n.9 (citing Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975)).
41 Id. (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974)).
50 See id. ("Insofar as our decision today is inconsistent with our dismissal in Orsini, we
overrule our prior decision.").
"' For other instances, see, e.g., Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 849 (1997) (refusing to treat
dismissal for want of a substantial federal question of a state ruling on ERISA preemption as
dispositive of the preemption question in a later case); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Caryl, 497 U.S.
916, 920 (1990) (per curiam) (refusing to regard a dismissal for want of a substantial federal
question as "the 'overruling [of] clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied"')
(quoting Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971) (brackets in original));
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 500 (1981) (treating summary affir-
mances and dismissals for want of a substantial federal question of appeals from rulings
upholding billboard regulations as having less precedential weight than full opinions on the
merits).
52 STERN ET AL., supra note 29, at 217. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366-67
n.16 (1975) (emphasizing the precedential value of a summary affirmance in a case raising
almost identical Establishment Clause issues), overruled on other grounds by Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 53 (1974) (relying in part
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mary dispositions of appeals should receive, there remains the problem of
determining exactly what such rulings decided. Because they contain little or
no reasoning, this can be a most daunting task. The Court has struggled with
this problem on several occasions.
The leading case on the subject is Mandel v. Bradley,5 3 a challenge to
Maryland's ballot-access rules for independent candidates. The three-judge dis-
trict court gave dispositive weight to the summary affirmance of a decision
invalidating Pennsylvania's access rules for independents.54 The Supreme
Court held that the lower court erred in doing so. The Pennsylvania law
required independents to obtain their signatures within a twenty-one day win-
dow and submit them 244 days before the general election.5 5 The Maryland
law required independents to file their signatures almost as far in advance but
did not restrict when the signatures had to be collected.5 6 The summary affirm-
ance in the Pennsylvania case did not necessarily control the Maryland dispute
because the Free State's access rules differed somewhat from the Keystone
State's.
The summary disposition, in other words, "affirm[ed] the judgment but
not necessarily the reasoning by which it was reached."' 57 The Court added that
"[s]ummary affirmances and dismissals for want of a substantial federal ques-
tion without doubt reject the specific challenges presented in the [jurisdictional]
statement [and] prevent lower courts from coming to opposite conclusions on
the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions."'58 Such
rulings do not "break[ ] new ground" but simply "apply[ ] principles estab-
lished by prior decisions to the particular facts involved" in those cases. 59 The
Court has repeatedly endorsed this restrictive view of the precedential effect of
summary dispositions of appeals.6 °
Determining the "specific challenges" presented and the "precise issues"
that were "necessarily decided" in a summary disposition can be quite diffi-
cult.6 The task can be especially daunting with respect to dismissals for want
of a substantial federal question, because such dispositions might be viewed as
either substantive or jurisdictional in nature. Indeed, the term-limits cases dis-
on two summary affirmances in rejecting a constitutional challenge to laws disenfranchising
convicted felons).
53 432 U.S. 173 (1977) (per curiam).
51 See id. at 175 (citing Tucker v. Salera, 424 U.S. 959 (1976)).
55 See id.
56 See id. at 177. Maryland's filing deadline could be as much as 240 days before a presi-
dential election. See id. at 174.
17 Id. at 176 (quoting Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 391 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring)).
58 Id. (emphasis added).
59 Id.
60 See, e.g., Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 180-83
(1979); Wash. v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463,
477 n.20 (1979).
61 This analysis presumably requires access to "most if not all of the appeal papers in the
earlier proceedings." STERN ET AL., supra note 29, at 220. See also Winnick, supra note 30,
at 528-29 (discussing factors relevant to determining the "reach and content" of a summary
disposition).
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cussed at the outset suggest that the jurisdictional interpretation retains vitality.
For that reason, we now turn to this subject.
III. UNTANGLING THE MEANING OF "SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL QUESTION"
Corrigan v. Buckley,62 an early case involving racially restrictive cove-
nants,6 3 demonstrates how the Supreme Court has elided the distinction
between jurisdiction and the merits when the substantiality of a federal question
is at issue. Irene Corrigan, a white woman, agreed to sell her home in Washing-
ton, D.C., to an African American woman named Helen Curtis. The property
was subject to a covenant prohibiting its sale, occupancy, lease, or gift to "any
person of the negro [sic] race or blood."' A white neighbor, John Buckley,
sought to enjoin the transaction, and Corrigan moved to dismiss his complaint.
The trial court denied the motion and was affirmed by the United States Court
of Appeals sitting as the highest local court for the District of Columbia.65
Corrigan then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Corrigan argued that the covenant violated the Fifth, Thirteenth, and Four-
teenth Amendments as well as various Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes.
A unanimous Court, in an opinion by Justice Sanford, concluded that the con-
stitutional claim was "entirely lacking in substance or color of merit"6 6 because
the case involved only private rather than governmental action. The statutory
argument was "equally unsubstantial" for the same reason.67 Because neither
contention raised a substantial federal question, the appeal was "dismissed for
want of jurisdiction. '68 Despite this formal statement of the grounds for dispo-
sition, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Court had rejected the
claim on the merits. The jurisdictional defect was intimately connected to the
flaws of the substantive claim.
The Corrigan Court's invocation of jurisdiction as a basis for dismissing
an appeal that was regarded as weak on the merits reflected common practice at
the time. That approach differs from cases like Moore v. McCartney, where the
appeals were summarily dismissed for want of a substantial federal question,
because Corrigan was dismissed after a detailed analysis of the merits. Under-
standing how this practice arose can nonetheless help us more clearly under-
stand the correct meaning of summary dismissals for want of a substantial
federal question. That understanding emerges from both early case law (all of
which comes from cases with reasonably detailed opinions) and the evolution
of the Supreme Court's rules. This article considers each of these topics, then
examines the Court's more recent summary dispositions of appeals.
62 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
63 As the following text explains, Corrigan rejected the challenge to the racial covenants at
issue. This ruling was effectively circumvented in Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948),
which held that judicial enforcement of such covenants violated the Fifth Amendment. See
also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that enforcement of similar covenants
by state courts violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
64 Corrigan, 271 U.S. at 327.
65 See id. at 328-29; 299 F. 899 (D.C. Cir. 1924).
66 Corrigan, 271 U.S. at 330.
67 Id. at 330-31.
68 Id. at 332.
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A. Early Cases
The Supreme Court first announced that a substantial question was neces-
sary to invoke its jurisdiction on appeal in Millingar v. Hartupee,69 an 1867
case that had its roots in the Union blockade of the Confederacy during the
Civil War. Hartupee sued Millingar in a Pennsylvania state court for the value
of cotton that Millingar had sold. The cotton was seized by the federal govern-
ment during the Union blockade and released to Millingar by the United States
District Court for the Northern District of New York. Hartupee had earlier
obtained a judgment against a man named Gearing and claimed that Gearing
was the true owner of the cotton. Millingar denied Gearing's interest, but the
state courts ruled for Hartupee.7 ° Millingar then appealed to the Supreme
Court, contending that the state courts had denied effect to the federal district
court's release of the cotton to him and that this brought the case within the
Court's jurisdiction.7 1
Hartupee successfully moved to dismiss the appeal. Chief Justice Chase
found nothing in the federal district court's order that addressed the ownership
of the cotton; the order simply released the government's claim.7 2 Accordingly,
there was no federal action involved in the dispute between Millingar and Har-
tupee. "Something more than a bare assertion of such an authority seems essen-
tial to the jurisdiction of this court," Chase explained.73 Because there was not
even a colorable claim of federal action, the Court lacked jurisdiction over the
appeal and granted the motion to dismiss."
The next development, in 1872, was actually a slight detour from Millin-
gar. In Pennywit v. Eaton,7 5 the Court denied a motion to dismiss for want of
jurisdiction despite a strong suspicion that the appeal lacked merit. Seeking to
enforce a Louisiana judgment, Eaton had sued Pennywit in an Arkansas state
court. Pennywit contested the validity of the judgment on the ground that the
Louisiana judge had been appointed by the military governor at the height of
the Civil War. This arrangement, Pennywit claimed, violated Article IIl (in that
the Louisiana court had not been created by Congress) and the Appointments
Clause (in that the President had not nominated the judge and the Senate had
not confirmed him). 76 The Arkansas state courts rejected Pennywit's argu-
ments. The Supreme Court, in a brief opinion by Chief Justice Chase, con-
cluded that Pennywit had raised a federal question, "though somewhat
obscurely," and therefore declined to dismiss the appeal on jurisdictional
grounds despite its obvious weakness.
77
69 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 258 (1867).
70 See id. at 259.
71 See id. at 260.
72 See id. at 262.
73 Id. at 261.
74 See id. at 262.
7- 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 380 (1872).
76 See id. at 380-81.
77 Id. at 381. After hearing arguments on the merits, the Court dispatched Pennywit's claim
in a single paragraph and assessed him damages because the appeal seemed to have been
prosecuted only for delay. See Pennywit v. Eaton, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 382, 384 (1872).
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The Court overcame its reluctance to dispatch frivolous appeals in City of
Chanute v. Trader.7 8 This 1889 case still reflected uneasiness over treating
substantively weak cases as jurisdictionally flawed, however. Trader won a
lawsuit in a federal court against the city for overdue payment of municipal
bonds, then prevailed in a second action to compel satisfaction of that judg-
ment.7 9 The city appealed to the Supreme Court, and Trader moved to dismiss
or affirm. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Blatchford, the Court con-
cluded that the case was technically within its jurisdiction but that the appeal
was patently frivolous. Exercising "its inherent power and duty to administer
justice," the Court affirmed the lower court's ruling without briefs or arguments
on the merits.
8 °
Two years later, the Court returned to Millingar's jurisdictional approach.
City of New Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works Co. 81 dealt with an alleged
violation of the Contracts Clause. Although the 1877 statute chartering the
company purported to give the city free water service, an 1884 law required the
city to pay for water.82 When the state courts rejected the claim that the 1884
action breached a contract embodied in the 1877 legislation, the city appealed
to the Supreme Court. Relying on Millingar, the Court dismissed the appeal on
the company's motion. Justice Brown explained that the 1877 statute did not
create a legal contract.83 Accordingly, the "bare averment" of a contract was
entirely insufficient to invoke the Contracts Clause and thereby bring the
appeal within the Court's jurisdiction.8" In the absence of a properly presented
federal question, the motion to dismiss was granted.85
The cases discussed so far all dealt with extremely weak, if not frivolous,
claims. Even in those situations, the Court was sometimes reluctant to treat
clearly fanciful contentions as jurisdictionally defective. Early in the twentieth
century, however, the Millingar approach came to be applied to plausible but
ultimately unpersuasive arguments, especially ones that had been addressed in
earlier cases. The first example of this phenomenon was New Orleans Water-
works Co. v. Louisiana, 6 a challenge to the forfeiture of the charter of the
same company that was involved in the City of New Orleans dispute a decade
earlier. The state contended that the company had failed to provide pure water
to its customers and had charged excessive rates for its services.8 7 After the
state courts upheld the forfeiture, the company appealed to the Supreme Court
on the grounds that the state had impaired its contractual rights and taken its
78 132 U.S. 210 (1889).
79 See id. at 211.
80 Id. at 214.
81 142 U.S. 79 (1891).
82 See id. at 80-81, 84.
83 See id. at 88-89, 92 (explaining that the state courts had held the alleged contract ultra
vires, the city had repudiated whatever contract might have existed, and the Contracts Clause
does not protect municipalities because their charters are subject to revision or revocation by
the state legislature at any time).
84 id. at 87.
85 See id. at 93.
86 185 U.S. 336 (1902).
87 See id. at 338.
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property without due process.8 8 After invoking Millingar for the view that the
Court's jurisdiction cannot arise from the "mere claim" of a federal question,8 9
Justice Peckham devoted six pages to discussing several cases that foreclosed
the company's claims90 and almost four more to applying those precedents to
the facts of the case.9" This extensive analysis led to the conclusion that the
company's federal claims were "so clearly without color of foundation that this
court is without jurisdiction in this case," so the appeal was dismissed.9 2
A few months later, the Court combined its analysis of dismissal and
affirmance in substantively weak appeals. The move came in Equitable Life
Assurance Society of the United States v. Brown,9 3 a dispute over a life insur-
ance policy. After the policy owner died, competing claims were filed: one on
behalf of his daughter in a Hawaii territorial court, and another by a relative of
the decedent in New York. The company refused to pay the daughter, the legal
heir, because of the pendency of the New York action. The territorial courts
ruled in favor of the daughter, and the company appealed to the Supreme
Court. 94 Her representative moved to dismiss or affirm.
The Court concluded that the company's position had been squarely
rejected in a previous case.95 Like New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana,
therefore, this appeal involved "a question adequate, abstractly considered, to
confer jurisdiction," but that question was "so explicitly foreclosed by a deci-
sion or decisions of this court as to leave no room for real controversy. '96 The
federal question, then, was "devoid of any substantial foundation or merit," and
this case was controlled by the New Orleans Waterworks Co. rule.97
In other words, the dispositive motion should be granted, but which dispo-
sition was appropriate? Then-Justice Edward White explained that "it [was]
obvious that on this record either the motion to dismiss should be allowed or
the motion to affirm granted, and that the allowance of the one or the granting
of the other will ... finally dispose of this controversy." 98 Jurisdiction and the
merits were inextricably intertwined: "the unsubstantiality of the [f]ederal
question for the purpose of the motion to dismiss and its unsubstantiality for the
purpose of the motion to affirm are one and the same thing." 99 The Court chose
to grant the motion to dismiss, because "the better practice is to cause our
decree to respond to the question which arises first in order for decision."' '
88 See id. at 343-44.
89 Id. at 344.
90 See id. at 346-51 (quoting extensively from Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Needles, 113 U.S.
574 (1885)).
9' See id. at 351-54.
92 Id. at 354.
93 187 U.S. 308 (1902).
14 See id. at 309-10.
95 See id. at 312 (discussing New Eng. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Woodworth, 111 U.S. 138
(1884)).
96 Id. at 311.
97 Id. at 314.
98 Id. at 315.
99 Id.
100 Id.
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The Supreme Court followed a similar approach in Zucht v. King, 10 ' a
1922 case that would be included for many years afterward in the Court's rules.
This was a challenge to a San Antonio ordinance requiring children to provide
proof of vaccination as a prerequisite for attending school. Although Rosalyn
Zucht properly raised constitutional objections to the ordinance, her contentions
were plainly foreclosed by Jacobson v. Massachusetts,10 2 which had upheld an
almost identical requirement.'0 3 Under the circumstances, Justice Brandeis
wrote, the federal questions were not substantial, so the Court had no jurisdic-
tion over the appeal. 10 4 Like Equitable Life Assurance Society, then, the juris-
dictional issue was closely connected to the merits. A dismissal for want of a
substantial federal question in these cases meant that the claim lacked merit
because it was either very weak or foreclosed by precedent. As a practical mat-
ter, such a dismissal amounted to an affirmance on the merits.
We can observe the close relationship between dismissal for want of a
substantial federal question and affirmance on motion by examining the evolu-
tion of the Supreme Court's rules. Those rules came to embody a pattern that
emerged from the cases: appeals dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question came from state courts, 10 5 whereas those affirmed on motion came
from federal courts.
B. Supreme Court Rules
The Supreme Court's general rules relating to disposition of appeals on
motion date from the 1870s. In 1878 the Court amended paragraph 5 of what
was then Rule 6 to provide:
There may be united, with a motion to dismiss a writ of error or appeal, a motion to
affirm, on the ground that, although the record may show that this court has jurisdic-
tion, it is manifest the appeal or writ was taken for delay only, or that the question on
which the jurisdiction depends is so frivolous as not to need further argument.' 0 6
lo 260 U.S. 174 (1922).
102 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
103 See Zucht, 260 U.S. at 176.
104 See id. at 177. The Court conceded that Zucht had raised a substantial equal protection
question, but that question entailed a claim that the ordinance was unconstitutional as
applied. Unfortunately, such a claim was then reviewable only on certiorari, see id., and her
certiorari petition had been dismissed for failure to comply with the rules for such petitions,
see id. at 176.
105 Equitable Life Assurance Society came from a territorial court, but the rules governing
appeals from that court were the same as those applicable to appeals from state courts. See
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S. v. Brown, 187 U.S. 308, 309 (1902).
106 97 U.S. vii (1878). The 1878 amendment built on similar language that had been
adopted two years earlier. That language governed writs of error to state courts. See 91 U.S.
vii (1876). The 1878 amendment extended the provision to cover appeals from federal
courts.
The Court concluded that the appeal in City of Chanute was "frivolous, and that it was
taken for delay only," City of Chanute v. Trader, 132 U.S. 210, 214 (1889), but found that
the circumstances of the case did not warrant invocation of Rule 6. See id.; Ulman & Spears,
supra note 24, at 512. The ruling therefore rested on the Court's inherent power. See City of
Chanute, 132 U.S. at 214. As we have seen, even before the adoption of Rule 6 the Court
invoked its inherent power to assess damages against a party who had prosecuted an appeal
only for delay. See Pennywit v. Eaton, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 382, 384 (1872).
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This provision was slightly reworded in ways that had no substantive effect in
the Court's 1911 rules.'" 7 Of particular significance, this provision suggests
that the Court lacks jurisdiction over frivolous or dilatory appeals. Paragraph 5
incorporates the Millingar approach, under which an appeal that has no basis
whatever can be dismissed without plenary consideration. The language does
not explicitly reach appeals that are foreclosed by prior decisions, such as New
Orleans Waterworks, Equitable Life Assurance Society, or Zucht, and none of
those cases mentioned Rule 6. The next revision of the rules, in 1925, changed
the word "frivolous" to "unsubstantial."'
'0 8
Significant change came in 1928, when the Court promulgated a new set
of rules. The new Rule 12 required appellants to file a statement "particularly
disclosing the basis on which it is contended this court has jurisdiction to
review on appeal the judgment or decree below."10 9 Specifically, the statement
had to "distinctly refer to the statutory provision believed to sustain the juris-
diction" 1 ° and "the cases believed to sustain the jurisdiction." '  Appellees
could file a responsive statement "disclosing any matter making against the
jurisdiction asserted by the appellant."' 12 Nothing in Rule 12 specified that
jurisdiction depended on the existence of a substantial federal question,
although new Rule 7 retained the essence of the 1925 amendment of old Rule
6, authorizing motions to dismiss any appeal where the determinative question
was "so unsubstantial as not to need further argument."' 13
The requirement of a substantial federal question was added to Rule 12 in
1936, with a specific reference to Zucht v. King. The revised paragraph 1 of
Rule 12, describing the contents of the jurisdictional statement, continued to
require a distinct reference to "the statutory provision believed to sustain the
jurisdiction.""' 4 There followed this inserted language:
107 The revised provision read, in relevant part, as follows:
The court in any pending cause will receive a motion to affirm on the ground that it is manifest
that the writ [of error] or appeal was taken for delay only, or that the questions on which the
decision of the cause depend [sic] are so frivolous as not to need further argument.
SuP. CT. R. 6(5), 222 U.S. (App.) 10 (1911).
1os The relevant portion of the revised rule then read:
The court will receive a motion to affirm on the ground that it is manifest that the writ [of error]
or appeal was taken for delay only, or that the questions on which the decision of the cause
depends are so unsubstantial as not to need further argument.
SuP. CT. R. 6(5), 266 U.S. 657 (1925).
"o9 Sup. CT. R. 12(l), 275 U.S. 603 (1928).
110 SuP. CT. R. 12(l)(a), 275 U.S. 603 (1928).
... SuP. CT. R. 12(l)(d), 275 U.S. 603 (1928).
112 SuP. CT. R. 12(2), 275 U.S. 604 (1928). This rule was revised four years later. Most of
the changes were unrelated to the matters discussed here. The only relevant change for our
purposes was the addition of the following language immediately after the passage quoted in
text: "There may be included in, or filed with, such opposing statement, a motion by appel-
lee to dismiss or affirm." SuP. CT. R. 12(3), 286 U.S. 603 (1932).
113 Sup. CT. R. 7(4), 275 U.S. 599 (1928). This paragraph provided, in relevant part:
The court will receive a motion to affirm on the ground that it is manifest that the appeal was
taken for delay only, or that the questions on which the decision of the cause depends are so
unsubstantial as not to need further argument. . . .A motion to affirm may be united in the
alternative with a motion to dismiss.
114 SUP. CT. R. 12(1), 297 U.S. 733 (1936).
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The [jurisdictional] statement shall show that the nature of the case and of the rulings
of the court was such as to bring the case within the jurisdictional provisions relied
on, including a statement of the grounds upon which it is contended the questions
involved are substantial (Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 177), and shall cite the
cases believed to sustain the jurisdiction. 1 15
The amended rule did not provide any further insight into the definition of a
substantial question, but the reference to Zucht (as well as the retention of the
paragraph in Rule 7 about cases involving questions that were "so unsubstantial
as not to require further argument") 116 made clear that the Court welcomed
motions to dispose of appeals where the issues were foreclosed by prior
decisions.' 17
Any doubt that the decision to dispose of an appeal on motion implicated
the merits should have evaporated with the promulgation of the Court's 1954
rules. The new Rule 15 distinguished between appeals from state courts (which
were governed by paragraph (1)(e)) and appeals from federal courts (which
were governed by paragraph (1)(f)). A careful reading shows that all appeals
received similar treatment whether they came from state or federal courts.
Rule 15(1)(e) provided:
If the appeal is from a state court, there shall be included a presentation of the
grounds upon which it is contended that the federal questions are substantial (Zucht v.
King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 177), which shall show that the nature of the case and of the
rulings of the court was such as to bring the case within the jurisdictional provisions
relied on [as required by Rule 15(b)(iii)] and the cases cited to sustain the jurisdiction
[as required by Rule 15(b)(iv)], and shall include the reasons why the questions
presented are so substantial as to require plenary consideration, with briefs on the
merits and oral argument, for their resolution. 
118
Rule 15(1)(f) provided:
If the appeal is from a federal court, there shall similarly be included a statement of
the reasons why the questions presented are so substantial as to require plenary con-
sideration, with briefs on the merits and oral argument, for their resolution. 119
The most striking feature of these provisions is the more expansive con-
cept of substantiality. Indeed, they use the word "substantial" in two different
senses. First, all appellants, whether seeking to overturn state or federal judicial
rulings, must demonstrate that the question presented is sufficiently important
to justify plenary consideration. Second, appellants from state courts must also
satisfy the traditional requirement, embodied in the reference to Zucht v. King
in Rule 15(e), that the issue not be frivolous or foreclosed by precedent. 20 To
115 Id.
116 SUP. CT. R. 7(4), 286 U.S. 598 (1932).
11 See Sup. CT. R. 12(1), 297 U.S. 733 (1936). Rule 12 was revised again in the Court's
1939 rules. The requirement of demonstrating the existence of a substantial question
remained, as did the reference to Zucht v. King, but the new version of the rule applied only
to cases involving appeals from state courts. See SuP. CT. R. 12(1), 306 U.S. 694 (1939).
That limitation was removed in 1942, and a reference to appeals from federal courts was
added to the one to Zucht. See SuP. CT. R. 12(1), 316 U.S. 715 (1942).
118 SUP. CT. R. 15(1)(e), 346 U.S. 962 (1954).
"9 Sup. CT. R. 15(1)(f), 346 U.S. 962 (1954).
120 See Comment, The Significance of Dismissals "For Want of a Substantial Federal
Question ": Original Sin in the Federal Courts, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 785, 786-87 (1968). The
reference to original sin is from Walter Wheeler Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the
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understand the implications of these two meanings of "substantial" in Rule 15,
we need to examine the procedures for disposing of appeals without plenary
consideration.
Rule 16 authorized motions to dismiss or affirm appeals. The rule denomi-
nated such motions differently depending on whether the appeal was from a
state or a federal court, but the differences in nomenclature could not conceal
the fundamental similarity of the legal consequences of granting the motion. 121
In an appeal from a state court, Rule 16(1)(b) allowed the appellee to move to
"dismiss" because the case "does not present a substantial federal question." 122
In an appeal from a federal court, Rule 16(1)(c) allowed the appellee to move
to "affirm" because "it is manifest that the questions on which the decision of
the cause depends are so unsubstantial as not to need further argument."'
123
These provisions remained on the books unchanged for more than a quar-
ter-century. 124 In 1980, Rule 15(1) was rewritten to make clear that appeals
from state and federal courts received the same treatment. The 1980 version
removed the reference to Zucht and the requirement that appellants from state
courts demonstrate the substantiality of the federal questions presented. Instead,
all jurisdictional statements, regardless of the court from which the appeal
came, had to include "[a] statement of the reasons why the questions presented
are so substantial as to require plenary considerations, with briefs on the merits
and oral argument, for their resolution." 125 The relevant portions of Rule 16,
governing motions to dismiss or affirm appeals, were retained with only cos-
metic changes. 126 All of these provisions were superseded by the rules adopted
following the effective elimination of the Court's appeals docket in 1988 and
the transfer of almost everything that had previously been dealt with on that
mandatory docket to the discretionary certiorari docket.1 27
Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 337 (1933) ("The tendency to assume that a word which
appears in two or more legal rules, and so in connection with more than one purpose, has and
should have precisely the same scope in all of them, runs all through legal discussions. It has
all the tenacity of original sin and must constantly be guarded against.").
121 Rule 16(1) contained a provision authorizing motions to dismiss, whether the appeal
came from a state or a federal judgment, if the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction because
the appeal was not taken consistently with a relevant statute or other provisions of the
Court's rules. See SuP. CT. R. 16(l)(a), 346 U.S. 963 (1954).
122 SUP. CT. R. 16(l)(b), 346 U.S. 964 (1954). The appellee could also move to dismiss
because "the federal question sought to be reviewed was not timely or properly raised, or
expressly passed on [in state court]; or [because] the judgment rest[ed] on an adequate non-
federal basis." Id.
123 SUp. CT. R. 16(1)(c), 346 U.S. 964 (1954).
124 See Sup. CT. R. 15(1)(e)-(f), 16(1)(b)-(c), 388 U.S. 944-45 (1967); 398 U.S. 1026-28
(1970).
125 SUP. CT. R. 15.1(h), 445 U.S. 999 (1980).
126 See SuP. CT. R. 16.1, 445 U.S. 1000-01 (1980).
127 See Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662; supra note 23 and accom-
panying text. Under this statute, the few cases that remain within the Court's mandatory
appeals jurisdiction (as opposed to the discretionary certiorari jurisdiction) arise from United
States district courts. The Court's post-1988 rules governing appeals appear in Rule 18.
This new rule eliminated most of the details specifying that the jurisdictional statement
demonstrate the necessity for plenary consideration, saying only that the statement must
"follow, insofar as applicable, the form for a petition for a writ of certiorari." SuP. CT. R.
18.3, 493 U.S. 1118 (1990). The provision about motions to dismiss or affirm contains no
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C. Implications
This background shows why we should reject the suggestions in Bates v.
Jones and Citizens for Legislative Choice v. Miller that the dismissal, for want
of a substantial federal question, of the appeal in Moore v. McCartney means
that the federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over challenges to state
term limits.' 2 8 The case law and the Supreme Court's rules governing appeals
evolved in parallel fashion. That evolution shows that dismissals of Supreme
Court appeals for want of a substantial federal question do not have broader
jurisdictional implications.
Early cases, notably Millingar v. Hartupee, spoke in terms of jurisdiction
as the basis for rejecting substantively weak appeals from state courts. 129 Weak
appeals from federal courts, on the other hand, were affirmed on motion. This
practice is exemplified by City of Chanute v. Trader. 3 ° It is unclear why the
Court used jurisdictional language to dispose of marginal appeals from state
courts but not from federal courts. After all, one of the early cases discussed
above, Pennywit v. Eaton, affirmed a state-court ruling rather than dismissing a
substantively weak appeal on the merits."' The leading treatise on Supreme
Court procedure observes that "[o]nly history would seem to have justified this
distinction."' 3 2 The problem was accentuated when the Court began to dismiss
plausible but legally foreclosed arguments, granting motions to dismiss appeals
from state courts in cases like New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana,
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States v. Brown, and Zucht v.
King when the questions presented were controlled by prior rulings.'
33
Meanwhile, the Court's rules also contained language that appeared to
combine jurisdiction and the merits in certain appeals. Old Rule 6, dating from
the 1870s, provided for dismissal on jurisdictional grounds for frivolous
appeals; the 1925 revision of that rule explicitly introduced the notion of sub-
stantiality into the process for disposing of appeals without plenary considera-
tion. 134 The 1936 amendment to Rule 12 of the 1928 rules and the 1939 rules
specifically required appellants to demonstrate the existence of a substantial
federal question in the jurisdictional statement. 135
details on the grounds for such motions. See Sup. CT. R. 18.6, 493 U.S. 1119 (1990). These
provisions were retained verbatim in the 1995 and 1999 versions of the rules. See 515 U.S.
1216, 1218 (1995); 525 U.S. 1210, 1212 (1999).
128 Judge O'Scannlain's suggestion that the court of appeals had no jurisdiction "to review
this case," Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843, 847 (9th Cir. 1997) (O'Scannlain, J., concurring in
the result) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1021 (1998), looks like a slip of the pen.
The federal courts of appeals have power to review all final judgments of the district courts.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994). If the Ninth Circuit had no jurisdiction, the district court could
not have had jurisdiction, either. Accordingly, the discussion proceeds on the assumption
that Judge O'Scannlain meant to suggest that no federal court had jurisdiction over the chal-
lenge to term limits for state legislators.
129 See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
130 See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
131 See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
132 STERN ET AL., supra note 29, at 266.
133 See supra notes 86-104 and accompanying text.
134 See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
131 See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
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If this were all that we had to go on, it might make sense to view the
dismissal of an appeal from a state court for want of a substantial federal ques-
tion as implying that the federal courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over
cases presenting similar issues. There is language in many cases suggesting that
the federal courts may not hear cases involving frivolous or foreclosed
claims. 13 6 But this approach, which the second Justice Harlan characterized as
"more ancient than analytically sound,"' 3 7 confuses jurisdiction with the mer-
its. As then-Justice Rehnquist explained, a complaint that lacks all merit should
be dismissed at the threshold for failure to state a claim, not for want of subject-
matter jurisdiction.' 38
Treating dismissals for want of a substantial federal question as jurisdic-
tional could also raise doubts about the precedential value of summary disposi-
tions of appeals, which in turn could imply that the Court got it wrong in Hicks
v. Miranda and other cases that treat such dispositions as having some, albeit
limited, precedential effect.' 39 If the absence of a substantial federal question
means that federal courts have no jurisdiction, then presumably a Supreme
Court dismissal for want of substantiality would not be a ruling on the merits
and could not bind other courts.' 4 ° It would also prompt questions about the
need for this category of disposition when the Court dismisses other appeals
"for want of jurisdiction."'' Those other jurisdiction-based dismissals do not
decide the merits and therefore have no precedential weight. 142 Conflating
jurisdiction and the merits therefore would add unnecessary complexity to an
already difficult field of law.
One last consideration counsels against treating dismissals for want of a
substantial federal question as having jurisdictional implications. If we take
seriously the notion that such a dismissal means that the federal courts have no
authority to hear cases presenting the same questions, we will effectively - and
unnecessarily - freeze the development of legal doctrine in the federal courts.
All such cases would have to be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdic-
136 See Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-011 v. Falvo, 524 U.S. 436, 440 (2002); Hagins v.
Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-38 (1974) (collecting cases). See also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3564 (1984 & Supp. 2001).
137 Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 404 (1970).
138 See Yazoo County Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Suthoff, 454 U.S. 1157, 1160-61 (1982) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). See also Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682
(1946). Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) (dismissal for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter) with FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted).
139 See supra notes 34-49 and accompanying text.
140 See J. Timothy Eaton et al., Petitions for Writ of Certiorari from the United States
Supreme Court to the Illinois Courts (28 U.S. C. § 1257), in ILLINOIS INSTITUTE FOR CONTIN-
UING LEGAL EDUCATION, ILLINOIS CIVIL APPELLATE PRACTICE § 31.12 (1997).
141 See, e.g., Moore v. Dupree, 510 U.S. 1068 (1994); Watkins v. Fordice, 507 U.S. 981
(1993). The categories "for want of a substantial federal question" and "for want of jurisdic-
tion" are not coterminous. Some appeals dismissed for want of jurisdiction were filed out of
time or have some similar procedural defect that does not go to the existence of a substantial
federal question. See STERN ET AL., supra note 29, at 267. On the other hand, appeals from
state-court rulings that rested on an adequate nonfederal ground have also been dismissed for
want of jurisdiction, even though the nonfederal ground might suggest the absence of a
substantial federal question in the particular case. See id. at 267-68.
142 See, e.g., Hopfman v. Connolly, 471 U.S. 459, 460-61 (1985) (per curiam).
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tion. To be sure, these claims could be asserted in state courts, with Supreme
Court review ultimately available. It is far from clear that the Supreme Court
has the practical ability to monitor interpretations of federal law in the state
courts, and some commentators have raised efficiency objections to such an
arrangement. 14 3
More important, actual practice is inconsistent with the no-jurisdiction
scenario described in the previous paragraph. On several occasions, the lower
federal courts have entertained claims involving issues that were seemingly
resolved by summary dismissals of Supreme Court appeals for want of a sub-
stantial federal question. Perhaps the most notable example is Minersville
School District v. Gobitis,'" the first compulsory flag-salute case. Despite sev-
eral cases in which the Supreme Court had dismissed, for want of a substantial
federal question, appeals from state courts upholding requirements that school-
children salute the flag, 4 5 the Supreme Court addressed the merits of the case
without the slightest hint that the lower courts had erred in exercising jurisdic-
tion. '46 The difficulty of the flag-salute issue is also shown by the brief life of
Gobitis, which was overruled only three years later in West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette.14 7
Even if there were more basis for the view that a dismissal for want of a
substantial federal question has jurisdictional implications, the Supreme
Court's summary dispositions are open to a very different interpretation. We
can see this from Rule 15(1)(e) adopted in 1954, which reflected the Court's
previous practice and remained on the books without meaningful revision until
after the elimination of appeals from state courts in 1988.148 That rule governed
the contents of jurisdictional statements.
143 See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Artful Pleading: A Doctrine in Search of Definition, 76 TEX.
L. REV. 1781, 1820 (1998).
]- 310 U.S. 586 (1940). The challenger's name was misspelled in the official report. The
correct spelling is "Gobitas." See PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT 338 (1999).
"' See Hering v. State Bd. of Educ., 303 U.S. 624 (1938), dismissing appeal for want of a
substantial federal question from 194 A. 177 (N.J. 1937); Leoles v. Landers, 302 U.S. 656
(1937), dismissing appeal for want of a substantial federal question from 192 S.E. 218 (Ga.
1937). The Court had also summarily affirmed an appeal from a federal court on the same
question. See Johnson v. Town of Deerfield, 306 U.S. 621 (1939), summarily affig 25 F.
Supp. 918 (D. Mass. 1939). In all of these cases, the Court cited Hamilton v. Regents of the
University of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934), which upheld a military-training requirement
for university students over religious objections.
146 The opinion, by Justice Frankfurter, did note the conflict between the rulings by the
district court and court of appeals in Gobitis and the earlier summary dispositions, See 310
U.S. at 592 n.2. In light of Frankfurter's long record as a student of the Court's jurisdiction
even before his appointment to the bench, see, e.g., FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 24;
Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 25, the failure even to allude to a possible jurisdictional
problem cannot be regarded as a judicial oversight.
147 319 U.S. 624 (1943). For other examples of situations in which the Supreme Court
considered issues that had previously arisen in appeals that had been dismissed for want of a
substantial federal question, see Arthur D. Hellman, Error Correction, Lawmaking, and the
Supreme Court's Exercise of Discretionary Review, 44 U. PIrr. L. REV. 795, 818-19 (1983);
Comment, supra note 120, at 788.
148 See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
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As explained earlier, Rule 15(l)(e) used the word "substantial" in two
distinct ways.' 4 9 First, appellants from state courts were expected to show that
"the federal questions are substantial"; this instruction was accompanied by a
reference to Zucht v. King. Second, appellants had to explain "why the ques-
tions presented are so substantial as to require plenary consideration, with
briefs on the merits and oral argument, for their resolution." Identical language
appeared in Rule 15(l)(f), which was directed at appellants from federal courts.
Appellants in cases coming from state courts who sought a ruling upholding the
judgment below without plenary consideration were instructed by Rule
16(1)(b) to file a motion to dismiss for want of a substantial federal question,
while Rule 16(1)(c) told appellants from federal courts to move to affirm.150
If the Court granted a Rule 16(l)(b) motion to dismiss for want of a sub-
stantial federal question, then, the grounds for the summary disposition of the
appeal from a state court would remain ambiguous. Perhaps the case presented
a frivolous or foreclosed question, in which event the dismissal might have
jurisdictional implications for the lower federal courts. But the terms of Rule
15(1) made it equally plausible to infer that the motion to dismiss had been
granted because the questions presented, while not utterly lacking in merit,
were not sufficiently important to justify the time, energy, and expense of ple-
nary consideration. 5 ' Because summary dismissals typically appear in one-
sentence orders unaccompanied by even a citation, let alone a skeletal explana-
tion, it is impossible to tell why an appeal from a state court was dismissed. If
we cannot tell the grounds for decision, we cannot determine, as the Court
explained in Mandel v. Bradley, "the precise issues presented and necessarily
decided" by the summary dismissal for want of a substantial federal ques-
tion. 52 This in turn militates against reading too much into such a disposition.
To return to the suggestions of jurisdictional problems in Bates v. Jones
and Citizens for Legislative Choice v. Miller, there were neither citations nor
reasoning in the order dismissing the appeal in Moore v. McCartney. 5 3 For
this reason, we have no way of knowing which concept of substantiality
prompted the Court to dismiss the appeal summarily. The federal question
might have been frivolous or foreclosed, but it might also have been regarded
as less urgent than other matters on the Court's docket that warranted plenary
consideration. We are left to speculate about the grounds for the disposition.
With no clues from the Supreme Court's unadorned dismissal order, there is no
justification for treating the order as resting on some jurisdictional defect.
Accordingly, the notion that the challenges to term limits for state legislators
may be heard only in state court (with the possibility of discretionary review by
the Supreme Court) should be rejected.
149 See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
'5o See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
151 Chief Justice Warren made this point explicitly in a speech to the American Law Insti-
tute shortly after the 1954 rules were promulgated. See Frederick Bemays Wiener, The
Supreme Court's New Rules, 68 HARv. L. REV. 20, 51 (1954). The rules were promulgated
on April 12, 1954. See 346 U.S. 943 (1954). The Chief Justice's talk took place on May 19.
See Wiener, supra, at 50 n.135.
152 See supra text accompanying note 58.
151 See 425 U.S. 946 (1976).
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IV. CONCLUSION
With the effective elimination of the mandatory appeal jurisdiction in
1988, it is easy to lose sight of the meaning of summary dismissals for want of
a substantial federal question. These dismissals, in appeals from state courts,
were the equivalent of summary affirmances of appeals from federal courts. In
other words, the questions presented by such appeals did not require plenary
consideration. Summary dismissals for want of a substantial federal question
therefore should have no jurisdictional implications for subsequent cases
presenting the same issues in federal district courts. If the same issue is subse-
quently presented in a federal district court and there is no reason to believe
that intervening doctrinal developments have undermined the summary dismis-
sal, the correct response is to dismiss the new complaint for failure to state a
claim, not for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Before closing, however, we should briefly consider the Supreme Court's
most recent dismissal of an appeal for want of a substantial federal question. In
Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives,154 two
sets of plaintiffs challenged the Census Bureau's plan to use statistical adjust-
ment to correct for undercount in determining the population used for appor-
tioning congressional seats among the states. After upholding one set of
plaintiffs' statutory challenge to the plan,' 55 the Court turned to the claims
asserted by the House. Concluding that the legal issues raised by the House had
been resolved in the companion case, the Court determined that the House's
case "no longer present[ed] a substantial federal question" and dismissed the
appeal. 1
56
At first blush, the disposition of the appeal in the House's case is remarka-
ble. Unlike the typical appeal that is dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question, the House's case came up on appeal from a federal court, not from a
state court.' 57 This novel procedural gambit can best be explained as a creative
judicial response to the extraordinarily sensitive jurisdictional issue lurking in
the case. It is not clear that the House of Representatives had standing to bring
its lawsuit in the first place. After many years of avoiding the issue, 58 the
Court only recently had concluded that individual members of Congress gener-
ally lack standing to challenge laws or policies of dubious constitutionality or
legality. That ruling came in Raines v. Byrd,159 a challenge to the Line Item
Veto Act. That statute was invalidated the following year in Clinton v. City of
154 525 U.S. 316 (1999).
115 See id. at 343.
156 Id. at 344.
157 See U.S. House of Representatives v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 11 F. Supp. 2d 76
(D.D.C. 1998) (3-judge court).
158 See, e.g., Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987) (declining to determine the standing of
members of Congress because the case had become moot); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,
721 (1986) (avoiding a ruling on the standing of a congressional plaintiff because another
challenger clearly had standing to sue); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (directing
the dismissal of a complaint filed by members of Congress but not specifying the basis for
that ruling). Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (allowing a member to chal-
lenge his exclusion from the House of Representatives).
"9 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
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New York, 16 0 a case brought by other parties. Raines v. Byrd did not resolve
whether either or both chambers of Congress could ever have standing, but the
decision at least implied the plausibility of that potentially difficult question.
Stretching the "substantial federal question" doctrine to the House's appeal
from a federal court in the census case enabled the justices to avoid a possible
confrontation with a coequal branch if they ruled that the House lacked stand-
ing while at the same time resolving the substantive question on the merits in
the case brought by the other plaintiffs.
We should not, therefore, read more into this unusual ruling than the
unique circumstances of the case justify. At a general level, the confusion over
the meaning of summary dismissals of appeals for want of a substantial federal
question further attests to the wisdom of the effective elimination of the
Supreme Court's mandatory appeal jurisdiction in favor of discretionary certio-
rari review. Unfortunately, as the misleading jurisdictional suggestions in Bates
v. Jones and Citizens for Legislative Choice v. Miller demonstrate, we continue
to live with the mischief caused by the former procedures.
160 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
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